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I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This Appeal arises out of Defendant, Kevin Stokes, contention that a bill incurred 
immediately after the injury to the Respondent for transport from the site of the accident near 
Payette, Idaho to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise was unreasonable and he should 
not be obligated to pay this bill. 
Relying upon the precedent of Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 
779 P .2d 395 (1989) the Industrial Commission found that the Life Flight transport and billing 
therefore was reasonable. It is from that Order that Mr. Stokes now appeals. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondents generally agree with the Appellant's recitation of the Court of Proceedings 
below. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
Respondents agree and adopt the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact set forth in 
paragraphs 1-10 of the Order. (R., pp 44-45). 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b )( 4), Respondent alleges that additional issues are 
presented in this appeal which should be addressed as follows: 
1. Are the factual findings of the Industrial Commission supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
2. Does substantial and competent evidence exist to support the Industrial Commission 
conclusion that the transport charges in question were "reasonable". 
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3. Once the factual underpinnings for the decision of the Industrial Commission are 
examined, it becomes clear that the ultimate decision, i.e. that the treatment was "reasonable", is 
supported in the record and should be affirmed 
4. Is Respondent entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review on Appeal 
The terms ofldaho Workers' Compensation statutes are liberally construed in favor of the 
Employee. However, conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker. Warren 
v. William and Parsons, PC CPA, 337 P.3d 1257 (Idaho 2014); Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 
154 Idaho 750, 755, 302 P.3d 718, 723 (2013). 
In reviewing decisions by the Commission, this Court exercises free review over the 
Commission's conclusions oflaw, but will not disturb the Commission's factual findings if they are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Knowlton v. Wood River Medical Center, 151 
Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.3d 36, 41 (2011). 
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept 
to support a conclusion. McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp, 152 Idaho 582, 584-85, 272 P .3d 554, 556-57 
(2012) (quoting Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 
(2003). 
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. Zapata 
v. JR Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). The Court will not re-weigh 
the evidence, and the Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of evidence 
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Knowlton, 151 Idaho 140, 254 P .3d 141. All 
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facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the 
Commission. Zapata, 132 Idaho 515,975 P.2d 1180. 
The Court exercises free review over questions of law that are presented. Ogden v. 
Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P .2d 759, 760 (1996). Application oflegislative acts present pure 
questions oflaw over which the Court exercises free review. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, l 32 
Idaho 902, 905-06, 980 P.2d 566, 569-70 (1999). 
B. Analysis 
1. The Findings of Fact of the Industrial Commission are Supported by 
Substantial Competent Evidence and Should Not be Disturbed 
The Industrial Commission in this matter has made numerous findings of fact which 
Respondent contends the Court herein should not second guess because they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
The Industrial Commission found the basic set of facts that the Employer, Kevin Stokes, 
owns a farm at Fruitland and employed Respondent as an irrigater at the time of this accident and, 
unfortunately, was uninsured for purposes ofworkmens' compensation coverage. (R., pp 44-45). 
The Industrial Commission further found that on September 8, 2012 the Employer received 
a call from Payette County dispatch informing him that Respondent had been injured and had driven 
himself to the home of an off-duty Payette County Police Officer who called 911, summoning 
Paramedics and EMTs. (R., p 44). 
The EMTs who came to the scene at the Payette County Sheriffs home observed Respondent 
writhing and moaning and appeared to be in considerable pain. Respondent had vomited and after 
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the examination conducted by the EMTs at the scene, it appeared that it was possible that the partial 
amputation of Respondent's left small finger might be repaired. (R., p 44). 
Based upon this observation, the EMTs called and requested Life Flight to launch and 
transport the Respondent to Saint Alphonsus Hospital in Boise, Idaho. (See R., p 45). 
The evidentiary basis for this finding comes in the Paramedic records contained in this matter 
as follows: 
S - Requested to respond to 4515 Speas Road for a male patient with a partial 
amputation of his left pinkie finger. Patient is a 40 year old male: weighing approx. 
72 kg. Patient is Spanish speaking only and is unable to state how the injury occurred 
nor offer and (sic) subjective information. Bystander an off-duty Payette County 
Police Officer reports the patient came driving up to his residence in a vehicle and 
showed him his injury. Off Duty Payette County Paramedics EMT reports that at 
(sic) the patient has vomited once since his arrival with the patient. Bystander then 
called 911. Patient is unable to deny any pertinent negatives or positives .... 
0 - Arrived on location, found patient seated upright on a bench. Noted an off duty 
EMT elevating left hand. Primary: Patient presented conscious and alert, patient is 
not able to answer questions due to language barrier. Patient is writhing and moaning 
and appears in considerable pain .... upper extremities - right is unremarkable, left 
pinkie finger at the first knuckle is severely lacerated and appears fractured, no active 
bleeding present. Note strong regular bounding radial pulses. 
A - traumatic injury to left pinkie finger. 
P - off duty payette county paramedics EMT land-lines Medic 20 and advises finger 
may be able to be surgically fixed. Life Flight Network is requested to launch .... left 
pinkie finger was bandages and secured to ring finger with 4 X 4's and coban. Life 
Flight crew arrives. Patient care transferred to crew with a full verbal report. Medic 
20 cleared. 
(See Defs. Ex. 2, p 1, Report of CJ Trotsky, Paramedic). 
After transport to Saint Alphonsus Hospital in Boise, Idaho, and examination by the 
Emergency Room physician, Dr. Eric Thomas Elliott, Dr. Elliot noted that the Respondent had been 
transported by Life Flight with a 5th left fifth partial amputation and had been given medications 
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during the trip which eased his ongoing pain complaints. Dr. Elliott immediately ordered x-rays and 
found that the Respondent's left small finger had an open fracture of the mid-portion of his left 5th 
finger with dislocation of the PIP joint. Reviewing the radiology report, Dr. Elliott noted that an x-
ray of the left hand reviewed by himself noted that there was a dislocated PIP joint with a transverse 
commuted fracture of the mid-phalanx of the little finger with wide soft tissue injury at the site. (See 
Defs. Ex. 4, p 14). 
Unlike the "strong regular bounding radial pulses" which were found in the Respondent's 
little finger by the Paramedics at the scene of the accident, by the time the Respondent got to the 
hospital, he had no capillary refill present and no sensation to sharp object stimuli at the end of the 
little finger. (See Defs. Ex. 4, p 14). 
Based upon this presentation at the Emergency Room, Dr. Elliott found that the Respondent's 
small finger was likely non-viable. Despite this finding he still decided to consult with a hand 
surgeon and transfer care to the hand surgeon in the Emergency Room. (See Defs. Ex. 4, p 14). 
After Dr. Clausen, the orthopedic specialist, reviewed the case, he agreed that the end of the 
Respondent's left small finger could not be re-attached and a revision amputation was performed on 
the left small finger at the distal portion of the proximal phalanx. (See R. p 45). 
Life Flight sent Respondent a statement on September 12, 2012 with a due balance of 
$21,201.00 for the transport at issue. Employer refuses to pay this bill for the Life Flight transport, 
leaving Respondent liable therefore. 
Respondent contends that all of these factual findings are supported by substantial competent 
evident in the record and should not be disturbed. 
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2. Does Substantial and Competent Evidence Exist to Support the Industrial 
Commission's Conclusion That the Transport Charges in Question Were 
Reasonable 
The Industrial Commission started its analysis of the question presented below by citing to 
Idaho Code §72-432(1) which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"The Employer shall provide .... reasonable medical ... treatment ... as may be 
required by the Employee's physician ... " 
The Industrial Commission continued in its analysis by noting that under Idaho Code §72-
432(1) medical treatment is reasonable if the Employee's physician requires the treatment and noted 
that it was for the physician to decide whether or not the treatment was required. (See Mulder v. 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Co., 135 Idaho 52, 58, 14 P.3d 372,402,408 (2000). 
The Industrial Commission noted that pursuant to Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 
116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P .2d 395, 397 (1989), the only review that the Commission was entitled to 
make regarding the physician's decision was whether or not the treatment was reasonable. 
The first finding made by the Industrial Commission in this analytical framework addressed 
whether or not the EMTs and Paramedics at the scene and who ordered the Life Flight transport were 
"physicians" as defined by Idaho Code. Starting with Idaho Code §72-102(25), the Commission 
noted that a physician in Idaho includes members of any other healing profession licensed or 
authorized by the statutes of the State to practice their profession within the scope of their practice 
as defined by the statutes of the State. 
The Industrial Commission cited to Idaho Code Title 56 regarding an Emergency Medical 
Technician and noted that Emergency Medical Technicians licensed under Idaho Code Title 56 are 
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authorized to carry out the practice of emergency medical care within the scope of practice by the 
Idaho Emergency Medical Services Commission. 
Further, the Industrial Commission found that a Paramedic was also licensed pursuant to the 
provisions of Idaho Code Title 56 and were authorized to carry out the practice of emergency care 
within their scope of practice determined by the Idaho Emergency Medical Services Commission. 
The Industrial Commission found that the medical care was therefore ordered by a physician 
as defined by Idaho Code § 72-43 2( 1 ). Respondent contends that substantial and competent evidence 
exists to support this conclusion that it should be affirmed. 
Continuing, the Industrial Commission made findings of fact pursuant to the Sprague 
decision, supra, in order to determine whether or not the transport charges at issue were 
"reasonable". 
Despite the protestations of the Appellant, it appears very clear that a decision with regard 
to whether or not medical care is reasonable should be analyzed pursuant to the Sprague decision 
and its progeny. Indeed, when addressing this issue, reference to the Idaho Industrial Commission 
decisions demonstrate that this question has been analyzed pursuant to Sprague, supra, repeatedly 
over the years since the decision was issued in 1989. The Industrial Commission has been making 
findings pursuant to Sprague consistently since that time. There is no doubt that the Industrial 
Commission used the correct analytical framework to address this question. See Mulder v. Liberty 
Northwest Insurance Co., supra, 135 Idaho 58, 14 P.3d, 402 (2000). 
In this regard, the Industrial Commission made the following factual findings: 
(a) Did the Respondent make a gradual improvement from the treatment received? 
The Industrial Commission found that the Respondent did improve after he was transported to Saint 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7 
Alphonsus Medical Center and noted that the Defendants did not really dispute the improvement in 
the Respondent's condition. While it is difficult to analyze this particular case in terms of whether 
or not the treatment (helicopter ride) resulted in a gradual improvement in the Respondent's 
condition, the Industrial Commission noted the Respondent had no complications following his 
treatment at the hospital in Boise and that he had a well-healed and contoured amputation after 
everything was said and done. 
Respondent contends that this finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence 
and the Court herein should not disturb this finding. 
(b) Secondly, it is clear that the Industrial Commission made a finding of fact that the 
treatment (helicopter ride) was required by the Respondent's physician. The Industrial Commission 
found that the EMTs and Paramedics on scene qualified, because of their State licenses, as 
physicians under Idaho Code §72-432 and that they made their decision based upon their 
observations at the scene and their examination of the Respondent at the scene. It should be 
remembered that the EMTs and Paramedics on the scene did not have an x-ray machine and had only 
limited ability to medically assess the Respondent's injury. They found enough reason to be hopeful 
that the Respondent's finger could be re-attached to order Life Flight transportation for him directly 
to the closest regional trauma center, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho. 
The Industrial Commission specifically found that their analysis did not depend on the 
success of the medical care envisioned. That is, the compensability and determination of the 
reasonableness of the medical care did not depend upon whether or not the EMTs or Paramedics at 
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the scene were correct in their hope that the Respondent's little finger could be re-attached. See Page 
v. McCain Foods, Inc., 2009 IIC 0427.7 (Sept 2009) and Campagni v. The Disney Store, 2013 IIC 
0029.27 (April 2013). 
The Industrial Commission specifically noted that medical care will not be found reasonable 
only when it is successful and found that an evaluation of the injured worker's entitlement to medical 
care should not be made on the basis of a retrospective analysis centering upon whether or not the 
treatment was completely successful or not. 
Respondent herein would encourage the Court to follow the same rules of analysis. Certainly, 
the Industrial Commission disfavored any request to be a "armchair quarterback" and "second guess" 
the medical providers at the scene at the time of this accident. This kind of oversight and micro-
management is not the kind of review this Court has encouraged the Industrial Commission to 
conduct in its oversight of the rights of injured workers. 
As has been quoted many times, the Workers' Compensation Law is to be construed liberally 
in favor of the Employee whenever possible. See Jones v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 98 Idaho 458, 
567 P.3rd (1977); Birch v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 82 Idaho 323, 353 P.2d 1076 (1960). Liberal 
construction in favor of the worker is required to enable the act to serve the humane purposes for 
which it was promulgated, leaving no room for a narrow and technical construction. SeeHattenburg 
v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977). 
(c) Finally, the Industrial Commission found that the treatment received was within 
the physicians standard and that the charges were fair and reasonable and similar to other charges 
in the same profession. The Industrial Commission made note that there was no evidence that the 
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cost of the flight was unfair or unreasonable and found that the transport was a reasonable part of 
the treatment Respondent received for his industrial injury. 
It is noted that Appellant's take some issue with the decision of the EMTs to order the Life 
Flight in the first place and imply that the EMTs on scene were either incompetent or unqualified 
to make the decision. 
However, it is obvious from a review of prior decisions that in many cases, Life Flight is 
dispatched to the scene of an accident by EMTs, Paramedics or nurses. 
In Ferrin v. Bechtel, 2011 IIC 0003 (2011 ), a security guard slipped on some ice and hit his 
head. He was evidently attended by a nurse at the employer's facility who ordered Life Flight 
transportation after seeing that Claimant had struck his head, suffered a laceration, was only partially 
conscious. The employer in that matter did not raise any question that the transport was 
unreasonable. 
In Kurt 2003, Decedent v. Employer, 2003 IIC 0465 (2003) it appeared in a heart attack case 
that EMTs arrived at the scene of an injury and ordered Life Flight transport. This was not 
questioned by the Defendants. 
In Carl 2003 v. Employer, 2003 IIC 0838 (2003) it appeared that the Claimant was repairing 
a tire with an impact wrench when the tire and wheel blew off the hub and pinned the Claimant 
underneath the vehicle. EMTs arrived and ordered Life Flight to take Claimant to the nearest large 
regional hospital. Again, the charges of this transport were not questioned. 
In Jones v. Star Falls Transportation, LLC, 2007 IIC 0222 (2007) the Claimant was in a 
serious trucking accident and was taken by Life Flight to a local hospital on the orders of the EMTs 
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who attended the scene of the accident. This process, again, was initiated by EMTs and was not 
questioned by Defendants. 
The point here is that many times EMTs, or Paramedics, as the first responders, are charged 
with the responsibility to make decisions about whether or not medical care is immediately necessary 
and whether or not it is appropriate for Life Flight to become involved. It is not unusual for EMTs 
to make this decision in the slightest and is, therefore, in the terms of Sprague, within the physicians 
standard practice. 
Respondent, therefore, contends that all of the factual underpinnings to the Industrial 
Commission's decision about "reasonableness" are supported by substantial and competent evidence 
and should not be questioned on appeal. 
It should be noted that the Appellant's only argument in this matter is that the factual 
underpinnings of the Industrial Commission's decision are completely unsupported and that there 
are no facts which support the Industrial Commission's decision. 
Respondent contends that the record demonstrates quite to the contrary and that the facts do 
support the Industrial Commission's decision without equivocation. 
3. Once the Factual Underpinnings for the Decision of the Industrial Commission 
are Examined, it Becomes Clear That the Ultimate Decision, i.e. That the 
Treatment was "Reasonable", is Supported in the Record and Should be 
Affirmed 
In the Sprague case, the contention was that a chiropractic physician's medical care of the 
Claimant was not "reasonable" because an orthopedic physician said that the Claimant had reached 
maximum medical improvement and did not need further care. Despite this, the Claimant continued 
to treat with his long-time physician, a chiropractic physician in Caldwell. 
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In its findings, the Commission noted that the Claimant had made gradual improvement over 
time under the care of the chiropractor, that the chiropractor was a treating physician pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-432 and that the treatment was within the standard of practice of the chiropractic 
and that his charges were fair and reasonable. 
Despite these factual findings, the Industrial Commission found that the chiropractic care was 
unreasonable. This is the holding that the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court did so based 
upon the fact that the underlying factual findings were well-supported in the record by substantial 
and competent evidence. 
In this matter, the Respondent contends that the underlying factual findings of the Industrial 
Commission are, just like in Sprague, supra, supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Respondent contends that based upon these factual findings, this Court should find that the medical 
care at issue (the Life Flight transportation) reasonable, that the Industrial Commission should be 
affirmed. 
Notably, the Court in Sprague noted that once the treating physician requires treatment, the 
only review the Industrial Commission can make has to do with whether or not the treatment was 
reasonable and cannot make any review with whether or not the care is required. 
4. Attorneys Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 
Respondent in this case contends that the real issue presented to the Industrial Commission 
and to this Court is not whether the medical care at issue was really "reasonable" but whether or not 
it should have been required by the treating physician in the first place. Even though Defendant's 
couch their argument in terms of reasonableness, it appears very clear that their real argument in this 
matter is that this case should not have been ordered in the first place and was not necessary. 
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As noted by the Court in Sprague, supra, and Mulder, supra, neither the Commission nor this 
Court can review an EMT or Paramedics decision to require care in this case. Once the finding is 
made that the care was ordered by a treating physician, its necessity is not something which can be 
examined. When Appellant's argument is boiled down to its bare essentials, this is basically what 
they are saying. That the care was not necessary in the first place and should never have been 
ordered. 
Because the Appellants are requesting a review which is improper under case law and 
statutory frameworks which govern this case, Respondent contents that he is entitled to attorneys 
fees. 
Secondly, if the Court interprets this Appeal as centering upon whether or not the care was 
"reasonable", it appears very clear that this essentially asks this Court to review the factual 
underpinnings of the Industrial Commission decision and to re-weigh and re-assess the evidence 
presented in the Industrial Commission case. Clearly, when attorneys fees are properly awarded 
when an appeal does nothing more than ask the Court to review and re-weight the evidence 
submitted to the Industrial Commission pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. (See Duncan v. Navajo 
Trucking, Inc., 134 Idaho 202, 998 P .2d 1115 (2000); Sp ivy v. Novartis Seed, 13 7 Idaho 31, 43 P .3d 
789 (2002). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When reviewing the facts in this case and giving the Respondent the benefit of all inferences 
which flow from the evidence introduced in the Industrial Commission proceeding below, it 
becomes that the factual findings of the Industrial Commission are all well-founded and are based 
on substantial and competent evidence. 
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The Appellant in this matter asks this Court to re-weigh that evidence and make a finding that 
the evidence does not exist, that the conclusion of the Industrial Commission should therefore not 
stand. 
Not only does Respondent disagree vehemently with this allegation, Respondent feels that 
attorneys fees are warranted because of the undisguised request of Appellant's, requesting that this 
Court review the evidence in order to make its own decision. 
Respondent contends that the Commission's decision is well-supported, should be affirmed 
and Appellant's herein should be required to pay Respondent's attorneys fees for participating in this 
Appeal. 
DATED This~ day of February, 2015. 
By: ____ ~ ___ l_~ _
Richard S. Owen 
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